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"CLAUSE AND EFFECf": AN IMAGINED 
CONVERSATION WITH SANFORD 
LEVINSON 
Lief Carter* 
LC: Good to hear from you. I'm honored to join such good 
company for Farber, Frickey, and Sherry. Please send the details. 
SL: There is no written description. The basic idea is to se-
lect your least favorite clause of the current US constitution and, 
in 1000 words, explain why you would love to see it expunged. It 
should be something you think has significance for current gov-
ernance; you get no points by condemning the fugitive slave 
clause.t 
LC: That assignment for a pragmatic post-modernist like me 
is harder than you think. You remember that part in my Per-
gamon book where I show how significant clauses in the Consti-
tution have been interpreted in both short runs and long, in quite 
contradictory ways.2 "Clause and effect" views of constitutional 
law fail to make sense of two hundred years of constitutional his-
tory. Reality is so completely socially constructed that any one 
clause out of context is just a string of words. Any suspect clause 
that "has significance for our current governance," could go any-
where and hence shouldn't be expunged. 
SL: When will you postmodernists learn to stop hiding be-
hind that social construction line? Of course we construct. 
Please get on with doing a little social construction for us. 
LC: I'm not hiding, and I am constructing. I believe that 
legal language, like all language, has no intrinsic meaning out of 
context. Even if I could defend the proposition that a certain 
clause has done the most damage "so far," I could never show 
that such a clause could not support a different and highly desira-
ble construction in the future. Legal language is just a discipline 
• Professor of Political Science, University of Georgia. 
1. Professor Levinson's first statement is his e-mailed response to my request for 
details. All other "Sl..s" are purely my own invention. I could never hope to replicate 
Sandy's fine blend of articulate probing and gentle civility. 
2. See Lief H. Carter, Contemporary Constitutional Lawmaking: The Supreme 
Court and the Art of Politics 22-23 (Pergamon Press, 1985). 
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we impose to define the nature of our disagreements in trustwor-
thy enough ways that we don't go out and kill each other. 
SL: You take the Stanley Fish position? 
LC: Yes, but just the hook, not the line and sinker. The 
hook of course is that legal rules in their very ambiguity play a 
role in forming a kind of wisdom that transcends the rules. (Re-
member Fish's exasperated basketball coach in "Fish Vs. Fiss"?) 
But unlike Fish, I think current anti-foundationalist thought only 
marks our transition from one foundationalist paradigm to an-
other. Fish says we will continue to pretend we achieve founda-
tionalist determinacy. My line (and sinker, though I don't 
particularly like the metaphor) is that liberalism has struggled for 
three centuries to construct a foundational, natural law-like be-
lief in the natural reality of substantive indeterminacy, and hence 
a political commitment to the desirability of skepticism, mystery, 
and tolerance. 
SL: Yes, I know the pragmatic line and sinker: If it does 
work, it's "true." You're about to tell me that you can therefore 
take any constitutional clause and argue coherently both for and 
against expunging it. So try expunging the due process clause (or 
for that matter the equal protection clause) of the 14th 
Amendment. 
LC: Pieces of expunge cake! Without such clauses, would 
the late 19th century courts have been able to confine Fourteenth 
Amendment privileges and immunities to the right to travel, es-
pecially in light of Article IV privileges and immunities? We 
might have incorporated basic rights far earlier than we did, and 
confronted the evils of Reconstruction and its aftermath much 
sooner. And the equal protection clause is pure legal gobbledy-
gook, since all laws backed by sanctions inescapably discriminate 
and create inequalities-laws against murder treat those who 
murder differently than those who don't, and so on. 
SL: Would you care to justify the fugitive slave clause? 
LC: Sure, but remember I'm mainly trying to argue against 
clause and effect. As a tool for defining differences-for focus-
ing moral thought and for prodding us down that bloody road 
toward our aspirations (to focus our "constitutional faith," to 
plagiarize a bit)-it may well have been necessary to enshrine 
the devil of slavery in our constitution in order to have some-
thing to drive out of the temple. 
SL: Well, I agree it would not make sense to expunge, say, 
the Cain and Abel story from the Bible because we're offended 
by it. 
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LC: Right. Such biblical and constitutional clauses "work," 
or rather we find all sorts of ways of using such tools to produce 
work that we value. And the "we" in this sentence matters. So-
cial construction of reality means that the only point in my saying 
what I would expunge would be to construct something useful for 
you and our audience. 
SL: So you're writing this article like a Socratic dialogue to 
dramatize that truth is not "there" apart from social life. So let 
me play along and guess: You will expunge that which is least 
susceptible of doing work, right? 
LC: Yes, but not necessarily by expunging that which is in-
herently confusing. As I said, the equal protection clause is in-
herently confusing. And the truistic lOth amendment has done 
work, at least for Bill Rehnquist and George Will and more than 
a century of police powers fans. I can only argue for expunging 
(because they do no work) some part of the Constitution which 
we constitutional students and scholars find useless, e.g., have the 
hardest time remembering. 
SL: You mean the least litigated clauses? 
LC: Nope. We'll never know if we might have had a presi-
dent under 35. And the story, which I heard first from Mark 
Thshnet, about the 18 year old guru televangelist cum presiden-
tial candidate who claims according to his religion, protected by 
the First Amendment (which amends the 35 year old clause), that 
he is reincarnated and really a wise 70 year old, still works for me 
in class. I propose instead that our readers take the following 
short closed-book test and submit their results to Suzanna 
Sherry. Whichever question gets the most wrong answers be-
comes our socially constructed expunge winner. Here's the test: 
1. After a putatively disabled President declares in writing that 
he is not disabled, what is the minimum possible number of 
days he must wait before resuming the powers of his office 
without confronting constitutionally approved congressional 
opposition? 
2. Who counts the votes of the electoral college and who super-
vises the counting? 
3. Define the constitutional meaning of "Corruption of Blood." 
In what context, if any, is corruption of blood permissible? 
4. True or false: The President may convene both houses of 
Congress together but cannot convene only one house. 
5. What is the maximum permissible geographical size of the 
District of Columbia? 
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6. True or false: A vote of one fifth or more of the total mem-
bers of either house is sufficient to .... well, you get the idea. 
SL: But the rule here is to expunge what you think has the 
most negative significance for modem government. How can 
you argue that the least known and most trivial clauses are the 
most damaging clauses? 
LC: I'd like to argue that these clauses trivialize and "de-
moralize" the Constitution. But I don't really believe that. I 
have to fall back on the performance problem you've created for 
me. You've given me a 1000 words and you have not permitted 
me to add anything, only expunge. Social construction being in-
determinate as it is, I wouldn't dare just take out, say the refer-
ences that support the death penalty without adding a 
prohibition. Take the word "life" out of the due process clause? 
If you want to pin me down, I'd delete separate election of the 
president and have him or her serve at the pleasure of the Con-
gress, parliamentary style, but I can't begin to defend that coher-
ently in 1000 words, or do it without adding new clauses. 
SL: Aha! So rules do have effects. 
LC: Then how come I'm already way over my 1000 word limit? 
